New Lessons Learned from Berkeley & Stanford Lean LaunchPad Classes

Our Stanford and Berkeley Lean LaunchPad classes are over for this year, and as usual we learned as much from teaching the teams as the teams did from us.

Here are a few of the Lessons Learned from these two classes.

Have each team talk to 10 customers before the class starts
Each year we learn how to move more of the Lean LaunchPad class logistics outside our classroom so teams have more time for in-class learning.

A few years ago, we moved the formation of teams’ to before the class started and in doing so, saved a week of what normally be an in-class time activity. To make this happen, we hold three “information sessions” two weeks apart before the class starts. In these “info sessions” we describe the purpose of the class, and then let students mix, meet and form teams. During this pre-class time we share a Google doc where students who have ideas can find other team members, and students without an idea can find a team that matches their skills and interests. Application and admission to the class is by interview with a fully formed team.

Info session announcement

Info session announcement

The next thing we learned is to make applying to the class an integral part of the learning process. Teams apply by filling out both a business model canvas and a “competitive petal slide.” Having the teams do this accomplishes three things.  First it forces the students to read and understand “what’s a business model canvasbefore they even come to class.

Freewire application

Team Application: Business Model Canvas

Second, the competitive slide enforces a modicum of due diligence on the product and market. (We got tired of knowing more about each team’s market by doing a Google search as they presented. Now it’s their job.)

Farmsense competive slide

Team Application: Competitive “Petal” Slide

Finally, having teams spend time on the canvas and competition as part of the application process saves weeks of what would normally be an in-class activity (and as a bonus gives the team a heads-up about the difficulty of the class and shows whether they’re serious about the class or just shopping.)

This year we learned to raise the bar once again.  Could we get the teams to come into class having already talked to 10 customers? Instead of using the first class to have teams just present their business model canvas, this time the team’s first presentation would be about what they learned outside the building about their value proposition. (We pointed them to our tutorials on customer discovery and how to conduct customer interviews but didn’t expect them to be experts on week 1.)

SignUP week 1

1st week team title slide – 11 interviews before class started

We did an A/B test by requiring our teams in one school do this while not requiring it for the teams in the other school. The result?  Teams that had to talk to customers before the class hit the ground running. There was a substantive difference in team trajectory and velocity that continued throughout the quarter. The amount of learning between the two felt quite different. While there may have been other factors (team selection bias, team make up, etc.), we’ll now make this an integral part of all the classes.

Have each team put the number of Mentor interactions on their weekly title slide
The second innovation this year involved mentors. Each team is assigned a mentor as a coach. We’ve been trying to figure out how to make mentor engagements with their teams a regular rather an adhoc activity. While we have required the teams to add a summary of any mentor interaction to their LaunchPad Central narrative, we felt we didn’t have sufficient high-level visibility for these essential interactions.

GiveModo Class 8

But this year, a seemingly minor change to the teams’ weekly cover slide had an important impact. As teams present each week, their cover slides show the number of customers interviewed for that week (>10) along with the cumulative customers interviewed. This year we added one more metric for their cover slides– the number of mentor interactions for that week (>1) along with the cumulative number of mentor interactions.

This enhanced the visibility of the teams interaction (or lack of) with their mentors and allowed us to proactively intervene early if there wasn’t sufficient interaction.

Here are a few of the Final Presentations (see here for all of them)

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Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Get the Heck Out of the Building in Founder’s School: Part 2

With a ~$2 billion endowment the Kauffman Foundation is the largest non-profit focused on entrepreneurship in the world. Giving away $80 million to every year (~$25 million to entrepreneurial causes) makes Kauffman the dominant player in the entrepreneurship space.

Kauffman launched Founders School - a new education series to help entrepreneurs develop their businesses during the startup stage by highlighting how startups are different from big companies.

In January 2014 Part 1 of the “Startups” section of Founders School went online.

Now you can watch Part 2 “The Lean Approach“.

Founders School

This group of six videos provides an overview of how to successfully do Customer Discovery. You’ll learn how to:

  • get to know your customers
  • devise ways to test your hypotheses
  • glean insights from what you learn outside the building
  • get, keep and grow customers

As in the first part of this series, I’m in good company – I’m joined in Founders School by Noam Wasserman of Harvard teaching Founder’s Dilemmas, Craig Wortmann University of Chicago covering Entrepreneurial Selling, Peter McDermott helping understand Intellectual Property, and Nathan Gold offering how to give Powerful Presentations.

These videos are not only great tutorials for founders but also provide educators with another source of well produced and curated resources.

These “Startup and The Lean Approach” videos are a great general purpose companion to my “How to Build a Startup” lectures on Udacity.

And you get a tour of my living room and office…

Introduction, for Part 2 is here

Module 1, The Lean Method

  • 0:50: There are No Facts Inside Your Building — Get Outside
  • 1:28: Using the Business Model Canvas
  • 1:49: Use Customer Development to Test Your Hypotheses
  • 2:44: What is a Pivot?
  • 4:24: No Business Plan Survives First Contact with Customers

Module 2, Getting Out of the Building: Customer Development

  • 0:24: What is Customer Development?
  • 1:09: How Do You Start the Customer Development Process?
  • 1:36: Customer Discovery is a Series of Conversations
  • 2:05: The Founder and Customer Development
  • 3:16: Real World Example of Customer Development

Module 3, Customer Development Data

  • 0:31: Designing Experiments to Test Hypotheses
  • 0:48: Doing Customer Discovery Without Collecting Data is a Sin
  • 1:06: Insight is Key
  • 1:49: Why Accountants Don’t Run Startups

Module 4, Minimum Viable Products

  • 0:18: What is a Minimum Viable Product?
  • 0:38: What to Test, Why to Test and How to Test
  • 2:05: You’re Not Building a Product … You’re Getting Customer Feedback
  • 2:53: Use MVPs to Run Experiments
  • 4:15: Real World Example of an MVP

Module 5, Customer Acquisition and Archetypes

  • 0:47: Get, Keep and Grow Customers
  • 1:00: Create Customer Demand
  • 1:46: Customer Archetypes: Getting to Know Your Customers
  • 3:35: Matching Archetypes to Acquisition
  • 5:28: Growing Customers: The Lifetime Value
  • 7:35: The Biggest Mistake in Customer Acquisition

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Is This Startup Ready For Investment?

Since 2005 startup accelerators have provided cohorts of startups with mentoring, pitch practice and product focus. However, accelerator Demo Days are a combination of graduation ceremony and pitch contest, with the uncomfortable feel of a swimsuit competition. Other than “I’ll know it when I see it”, there’s no formal way for an investor attending Demo Day to assess project maturity or quantify risks. Other than measuring engineering progress, there’s no standard language to communicate progress.

Corporations running internal incubators face many of the same selection issues as startup investors, plus they must grapple with the issues of integrating new ideas into existing P&L-driven functions or business units.

What’s been missing for everyone is:

  • a common language for investors to communicate objectives to startups
  • a language corporate innovation groups can use to communicate to business units and finance
  • data that investors, accelerators and incubators can use to inform selection

While it doesn’t eliminate great investor judgment, pattern recognition skills and mentoring, we’ve developed an Investment Readiness Level tool that fills in these missing pieces.

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Investment Readiness Level (IRL) for Corporations and Investors
The startups in our Lean LaunchPad classes and the NSF I-Corps incubator use LaunchPad Central to collect a continuous stream of data across all the teams. Over 10 weeks each team gets out of the building talking to 100 customers to test their hypotheses across all 9 boxes in the business model canvas.

We track each team’s progress as they test their business model hypotheses. We collect the complete narrative of what they discovered talking to customers as well as aggregate interviews, hypotheses to test, invalidated hypotheses and mentor and instructor engagements. This data gives innovation managers and investors a feel for the evidence and trajectory of the cohort as a whole and a top-level view of each teams progress. The software rolls all the data into an Investment Readiness Level score.

(Take a quick read of the post on the Investment Readiness Level – it’s short. Or watch the video here.)

The Power of the Investment Readiness Level: Different Metrics for Different Industry Segments
Recently we ran a Lean LaunchPad for Life Sciences class with 26 teams of clinicians and researchers at UCSF.  The teams developed businesses in 4 different areas– therapeutics, diagnostics, medical devices and digital health.  To understand the power of this tool, look at how the VC overseeing each market segment modified the Investment Readiness Level so that it reflected metrics relevant to their particular industry.

Medical Devices
Allan May of Life Science Angels modified the standard Investment Readiness Level to include metrics that were specific for medical device startups. These included; identification of a compelling clinical need, large enough market, intellectual property, regulatory issues, and reimbursement, and whether there was a plausible exit.

In the pictures below, note that all the thermometers are visual proxies for the more detailed evaluation criteria that lie behind them.

Device IRL

Investment Readiness Level for Medical Devices

You can watch the entire presentation here

Therapeutics
Karl Handelsman of CMEA Capital modified the standard Investment Readiness Level (IRL) for teams developing therapeutics to include identifying clinical problems, and agreeing on a timeline to pre-clinical and clinical data, cost and value of data points, what quality data to deliver to a company, and building a Key Opinion Leader (KOL) network. The heart of the therapeutics IRL also required “Proof of relevance” – was there a path to revenues fully articulated, an operational plan defined. Finally, did the team understand the key therapeutic liabilities, have data proving on-target activity and evidence of a therapeutic effect.

Therapeutics IRL

You can see the entire presentation here

Digital Health
For teams developing Digital Health solutions, Abhas Gupta of MDV noted that the Investment Readiness Level was closest to the standard web/mobile/cloud model with the addition of reimbursement and technical validation.

Digital Health

Diagnostics
Todd Morrill wanted teams developing Diagnostics to have a reimbursement strategy fully documented, the necessary IP in place, regulation and technical validation (clinical trial) regime understood and described and the cost structure and financing needs well documented.

Diagnostics IRL

You can see the entire presentation here

For their final presentations, each team explained how they tested and validated their business model (value proposition, customer segment, channel, customer relationships, revenue, costs, activities, resources and partners.) But they also scored themselves using the Investment Readiness Level criteria for their  market. After the teams reported the results of their self-evaluation, the  VC’s then told them how they actually scored.  We were fascinated to see that the team scores and the VC scores were almost the same.

Lessons Learned

  • The Investment Readiness Level provides a “how are we doing” set of metrics
  • It also creates a common language and metrics that investors, corporate innovation groups and entrepreneurs can share
  • It’s flexible enough to be modified for industry-specific business models
  • It’s part of a much larger suite of tools for those who manage corporate innovation, accelerators and incubators

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

What I Learned by Flipping the MOOC

Two of the hot topics in education in the last few years have been Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC’s) and the flipped classroom. I’ve been experimenting with both of them.

What I’ve learned (besides being able to use the word “pedagogy” in a sentence) is
1) assigning students lectures as homework doesn’t guarantee the students will watch them and 2) in a flipped classroom you can become hostage to the pedagogy.

Here’s the story of what we tried and what we learned.

MOOC’s – Massive Open Online Courses
A MOOC is a complicated name for a simple idea – an online course accessible to everyone over the web. I created my MOOC by serendipity. Learning how to optimize it in my classes has been a more deliberate and iterative process.

If you can’t see the video above click here

When my Lean LaunchPad class was adopted by the National Science Foundation, we taught our original classes to scientists scattered across the U.S.  We adopted WebEx, a web video conferencing tool, to hold our classes remotely. Just like my students at Stanford, these NSF teams got out of the building and spoke to 10-15 customers a week. Back in their weekly class, the scientists would present their results in front of their peers – in this case via Webex, as the teaching team gave them critiques and “guidance”. When their presentations were over, it was my turn. I lectured to these remote students about the next week’s objectives.

Is it Live or Is It a MOOC?
After the first NSF class held via videoconference, it dawned on me that since I wasn’t physically in front of the students, they wouldn’t know if my lecture was live or recorded.

Embracing the “too dumb to know it can’t be done,” I worked with a friend from Stanford, Sebastian Thrun and his startup Udacity, to put my Lean LaunchPad lectures online. Rather than just have me drone on as a talking head, I hired an animator to help make the lectures interesting, and the Udacity team had the insight to suggest I break up my lecture material into small, 2-4 minute segments that matched students’ attention spans.

If you can’t see the video above click here

Over a few months we developed the online lectures, then tried it as a stand-in for me on the NSF videoconferences, and found that because of the animations and graphics the students were more engaged than if I were teaching it in person. Ouch.

Now the NSF teams were learning from these online lectures instead of video conferenced lectures – but the online lectures were still being played during class time.

I wondered if we could be more efficient with our classroom time.

Flipping
Back at Stanford and Berkeley, I realized that I could use my newly created Lean LaunchPad MOOC and “flip” the classroom.  It sounded easy, I had read the theory:
1) A flipped classroom moves lectures traditionally taught in class, and assigns them as homework. Therefore my  students will all eagerly watch the videos and come to class ready to apply their knowledge, 2) this would eliminate the need for any lecture time in class.  And as a wonderful consequence, 3) I could now admit more teams to the class because we’d now have more time for teams to present.

So much for theory. I was wrong on all three counts.

Theory Versus Practice
After each class, we’d survey the students and combine it with a detailed instructor post mortem of lessons learned.  (An example from our UCSF Lean LaunchPad for Life Sciences Class is here.)

Here’s what we found when we flipped the classroom:

  • More than half the students weren’t watching the lectures at home.
  • Without an automated tool to take an attendance, I had no idea who was or wasn’t watching.
  • Without lectures, my teaching team and I felt like observers. Although we were commenting and critiquing on students presentations, the flipped classroom meant we were no longer in the front of the room.
  • No lectures meant no flexibility to cover advanced topics or real time ideas past the MOOC lecture material.

We decided we needed to fix these issues, one at a time.

  • In subsequent classes we reduced class size from ten teams to eight. This freed up time to get lecture and teaching time back in the classroom.
  • We manually took attendance of who watched our MOOC (later this year this will be an automated part of the LaunchPad Central software we use to manage the classes.)
  • To get the teaching team front and center, I required students to submit questions about material covered in the MOOC lecture they watched the previous evening. I selected the best questions and used them to open the class with a discussion. I cold-called on students to ensure they all had understood the material.
  • We developed advanced lectures which combined a summary of the MOOC material with new material such as lectures focused on domain specific perspectives. For example, in our UCSF Life Sciences class the four VC’s who taught the class with me developed advanced business model lectures for therapeutics, diagnostics, medical devices and digital health. (These advanced lectures are now on-line and available to everyone who teaches the class.)

The class, now taught as hybrid flipped classroom, looks like this: Lean LaunchPad Class Organization

There’s still more to do.

  • While we use LaunchPad Central to have the teams provide feedback to each other, knowledge sharing across the teams still needs to be deeper and more robust.
  • While we try to give students tutorials for how to do Customer Discovery we need a better way to integrate these into the short time in quarter/semester.
  • While we insist that an MVP is part of the class, we need a more rigorous process for building the MVP in parallel with Customer Discovery

Outcomes
Besides finding the right balance in a flipped classroom, a few other good things have come from these experiments. The Udacity lectures now have over 250,000 students. They are not only used in my classes but are also part of other educators’ classes, as well as being viewed by aspiring entrepreneurs as stand-alone tutorials.

My experiments in how to teach the Lean LaunchPad class have led to a 2 ½ day class for 75 educators a quarter (information here.) And we’ve found a pretty remarkable way to use the Lean LaunchPad to organize corporate innovation/incubator groups. (We opened source our teaching guide we use in the classes here.)Educator's Program cover

Lessons Learned

  • Creating engaging MOOC’s are hard
  • Confirming that students watched the MOOC’s is even harder
  • The Flipped classroom needs to be balanced with:
    • Student accountability
    • Instructor time in front of the class
    • Advanced lectures

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Sometimes It Pays to be a Jerk

That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart; his passport shall be made
William Shakespeare Henry V | Act 4, Scene 3

band of brothers

The concepts in my Lean LaunchPad curriculum can be taught in a variety of classes–as an introduction to entrepreneurship all the way to a graduate level “capstone class.”

I recently learned being tough when you select teams for a capstone class pays off for all involved.

Here’s why.

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Our Lean LaunchPad class requires student teams to get out of the building and talk to 10-15 customers a week while they’re building the product.  And they do this while they are talking a full load of other classes.  To say it’s a tough class is an understatement.  The class is designed for students who said they want  a hands-on experience in what it takes to build a startup – not just writing a business plan or listening to lectures.

The class syllabus has all kinds of “black box” warnings about how difficult the class is, the amount of time required, etc.

Yet every year about 20% of teams melt down and/or drop the class because some of the team members weren’t really committed to the class or found they’ve overcommitted.

This year that drop out rate went to zero when I ran an accidental “be a jerk” experiment.

Here Are the Rules
We set up the Lean LaunchPad class so that teams hit the ground running in the first class. Before students are admitted, they formed teams, applied as a team with a business model canvas, had homework and were expected to be presenting their business model canvas hypotheses on day one of the class. Our first class session is definitely not a “meet and greet”.  The syllabus is clear that attendance was mandatory for the first class.

This year, at one of the universities where I teach in the engineering school, our quarter was going to start right after the New Year.  Some of the teams had students from the business school, law school and education school whose start dates were a few days later.

To remind everyone that attendance at the first class was required, we sent out an email to all the teams in December. We explained why attendance at the first class was essential and reminded them they agreed to be there when they were admitted to the class. The email let them know if they missed the first class, they weren’t going to be allowed to register.  And since teams required 4 members, unless their team found a replacement by the first week, the team would not be allowed to register either. (We made broad exceptions for family emergencies, events and a few creative excuses.)

I had assumed everyone had read the syllabus and had planned to be back in time for class.

Then the excuses started rolling in.

Be A Jerk
About 25% of the teams had team members who had purposely planned to miss the first class.  Most of the excuses were, “I thought I could make it up later.”

In past years I would have said, “sure.”  This year I decided to be a jerk.

I had a hypothesis that showing up for the first class might be a good indicator of commitment when the class got tough later in the quarter.  So this time, unless I heard a valid excuse for an absence I said, “too bad, you’ve dropped the class.”

You could hear the screaming around the world (this is in a school where the grading curve goes from A to A+.)  The best was an email from a postdoc who said “all his other professors had been accommodating his “flexible” schedule his entire time at the school and he expected I would be as well.“  Others complained that they had paid for plane tickets and it would cost them money to change, etc.

I stuck to my guns – pointing out that they had signed up for the class knowing this was the deal.

Half the students who said they couldn’t make it magically found a way to show up.  The others dropped the class.

The results of the experiment?  Instead of the typical 20% drop out rate during the quarter none left – 0.

We had a team of committed and passionate students who wanted to be in the class.  Everyone else failed the “I’m committed to making this happen” test.

Lessons Learned

  • Commitment is the first step in building a startup team.
  • It washes out the others
  • Setting a high bar saves a ton of grief later

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Time For Founders School

Having a film crew in your living room for two days is something you want to put on your bucket list.

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With a ~$2 billion endowment the Kauffman Foundation is the largest non-profit focused on entrepreneurship in the world. Giving away $80 million to every year (~$25 million to entrepreneurial causes) makes Kauffman the dominant player in the entrepreneurship space.

Kauffman just launched Founders School - a new education series to help entrepreneurs develop their businesses during the startup stage by highlighting how startups are different from big companies. After weeks honing the script and days of filming, I’m honored to present the “Startups” section of Founders School.

And I’m in good company – also in the series is Noam Wasserman of Harvard teaching Founder’s Dilemmas, Craig Wortmann University of Chicago covering Entrepreneurial Selling, Peter McDermott helping understand Intellectual Property, and Nathan Gold offering how to give Powerful Presentations.

These videos are not only great tutorials for founders but also provide educators another source of well produced and curated resources.

These “Startup” videos are a great general purpose companion to my “How to Build a Startup” lectures on Udacity.

And you get a tour of my living room…

Startups” introduction is here

Module 1, What We Know About Startups

  • 0:17: A Startup is not a smaller version of a large company
  • 0:45: The definition of a startup
  • 1:53: Types of Startups
  • 2:18: Startups in an Existing Market
  • 3:10: Startups in a New Market
  • 4:31: Startups in a Resegmented Market
  • 5:28: Startups in a Clone Market

Module 2, Startups Versus Big Companies

  • 0:43: Business Plans versus Business Models
  • 1:46: The Differences: Accounting, Engineering & Sales
  • 2:21: Accounting Metrics in a Large Company vs. Metrics that Matter in a Startup
  • 3:35: Job Titles in a Large Company can Sink a Startup
  • 6:07: Engineering: Waterfall Development in a Large Company vs. Minimum Viable Product in a Startup

Module 3, The Lean Method

  • 0:50: There are No Facts Inside Your Building — Get Outside
  • 1:28: Using the Business Model Canvas
  • 1:49: Use Customer Development to Test Your Hypotheses
  • 2:44: What is a Pivot?
  • 4:24: No Business Plan Survives First Contact with Customers

Module 4, Building Your Startup

  • 0:41: Don’t outsource Customer Discovery
  • 1:33: How to build your startup
  • 2:48: How to building your team
  • 3:15: Look for overlapping skill sets and complementary temperaments

Module 5, Pivot or Proceed, How to Decide

  • 0:33: Is there Product-Market Fit?
  • 1:00: Most startups fail
  • 1:20: Adopt a mindset of learning
  • 1:27: Proceed, pivot or restart

The second half of the “Startups” series is coming in March.

Go watch Founders School now.

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Engineering a Regional Tech Cluster-part 3 of 3 of Bigger in Bend

Dino Vendetti a VC at Bay Partners, moved up to Bend, Oregon on a mission to engineer Bend into a regional technology cluster.  Over the years Dino and I brainstormed about how Lean entrepreneurship would affect regional development.

I visited Bend last year and caught up with his progress.

Today with every city, state, country trying to build out a technology cluster, following Dino’s progress can provide others with a roadmap of what’s worked and didn’t.

Here’s Part 3 of Dino’s story…


As a transplanted Silicon Valley VC and now a regional investor, I often get asked, “How do we go about building up our local tech ecosystem?”

The short answer is, “One step at a time.”

In the beginning in Bend, “necessity was the mother of invention.” Local entrepreneurs just made it up as they went. But today we are intentionally engineering six distinct activities to support this tech cluster: entrepreneurial density, university, transportation, capital, accelerator, and business community.

Let’s look at each of these six elements in more detail and I’ll explain what we have been doing in Bend to accelerate each of these.

1. Entrepreneurial Density:
Density – the connection of like-minded firms and their support services – is a critical component of a cluster. The most fertile source of entrepreneurs is the population of existing entrepreneurial companies. But for clusters without sufficient firms you first need to attract companies to your region. However, it’s difficult to create density overnight. Entrepreneurs need to understand and believe the reasons why they should want to cluster in your region given there are other alternatives (nationally Silicon Valley or New York; regionally Seattle and Bellevue, Portland and Bend).

In addition to technical and entrepreneurial talent, a region also needs experienced executive talent with industry appropriate backgrounds and personal networks. The goal of this talent is to help mentor startups as they scale and navigate the myriad of issues they will face in growing their business.

Bend’s economic development agency (EDCO) and city leaders (Visit Bend, City of Bend) get it – and have started communicating that Bend welcomes and is friendly to entrepreneurs and startups. Word is spreading and there are lots of people up and down the West Coast who know of and have been to Bend. But it’s easy to get drowned out by the noise from Silicon Valley and other cities in Washington and Oregon. That means that in regional communities like Bend, everyone needs to turn up the volume to consistently sing praises that will not only put the community on the map but also ensure it doesn’t slip.

2. University
Almost every successful tech cluster has a local technical university. This provides a source of technical talent, research, etc. It’s extremely difficult to import enough talent to fuel a rapidly growing tech cluster, so a university is critical to organically generate and retain talent within the region. In particular it’s critical to offer technical degrees that train the talent pool needed to drive the local tech cluster

OSU-Cascades is a new four-year university in Bend that is beginning the build out of its new campus in Bend and offer computer science and user design courses. This effort was over a decade in the making and something that the local community fought hard for.

3. Transportation
Direct flights to the San Francisco Bay Area and other major metro areas (depending on location of the region) are vital to reduce the friction of conducting business, encourage talent to test drive your community, and attract investors and other ecosystem partners to the region.

Bend’s economic development agency (EDCO) has worked very hard to establish direct flights to major West Coast cities including San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, and Denver. At times this required rallying local business leaders to make advance purchases of flights to ensure enough passenger volume for the airlines.

4. Local Early-Stage Risk Capital
Early stage venture funds are more important than your mother. If this doesn’t exist your regional cluster is dead-on-arrival.  Organize risk-capital in the form of angel funds or venture funds, particularly at the early stage where the largest capital gap exists. This should be a strategic initiative within your state to close the capital gap with in-region capital sources.

Bend is now home to Seven Peaks Ventures and Cascade Angels, both born over the past year in response to the opportunity in the region. The state of Oregon is also making funds available to invest in and support the formation of venture funds within the state.

bvc-winner

Bend Venture Conference Winner

5. Local Entrepreneurial Community Entrepreneurial-driven Events
The local entrepreneurial community has been active in running Startup Weekends, launching the FoundersPad accelerator, running hackathons and Ruby on Rails conferences (Ruby on Ales), building out shared tech space, offering incentives (The Big Bend Theory) for startups to relocate to Bend from the Valley, and building up the state’s largest tech/venture conference, the Bend Venture Conference which is now going on its 11th year. There are many more efforts underway to build upon what has worked and continue the process of evolving and learning.

6. Business Community Support
One of the most difficult things to do is technically the easiest – a dispassionate self-assessment to understand what assets your community has and what you lack.

First, what is your value proposition to a family or business to locate in your region? Recognize that a big part of your job is to remove friction, drive awareness, and amplify the efforts of your local entrepreneurs. Successful entrepreneurs attract other entrepreneurs, so it’s vital to kick start the cycle.

Next, identify your goal. Is it creating a job works program? Stopping brain drain in the region? Attracting and building some key core competency in the region? Ideally your existing talent base and ecosystem naturally support the “core competency magnet” you want to develop.

Finally, put your money where your mouth is – help fund the events and programs in the early years. Once the tech cluster forms, these activities will become self-funding. The ROI won’t be obvious for some early on, but will pay dividends in time.

Regional Cluster Ecosystem

Regional Cluster Ecosystem

Summary: Bend Is a Global Entrepreneurship Experiment
There are about 25,000 economic development agencies in regional markets across the U.S., all trying to expand the number of businesses that create products and services sold outside their region. These regional businesses create primary jobs that lead to the creation of local secondary jobs.

The Bend experiment is a model to consciously engineer an entrepreneurial cluster in a regional market to spur economic development and job creation.

In the past most regional growth strategies have focused on attracting established companies looking to expand or open a new plant. While it may be strategic for the region to recruit some of these established businesses, those deals usually involve huge tax subsidies and typically create a small finite number of jobs. What isn’t part of most regional growth plans is the organic growth of an entrepreneurial tech cluster in the region. If successful, sewing the seeds of entrepreneurship can lead to a more rapid and sustainable job growth for the region.

By engineering a regional tech cluster, we can impact the trajectory of growth in the region and:

  • Slow and even reverse the historical migration of tech talent and capital out of the region/state
  • Locally grow successful tech companies to become amazing primary job creators
  • Recycle the wealth that is created by re-investing in the region versus transferring wealth to Silicon Valley
  • Help local successful entrepreneurial and technical talent stay local – by creating their next startup in the region versus emigrating to Silicon Valley
  • Create a more diversified and healthy economic base that includes tech entrepreneurs

The democratization of entrepreneurship has created a huge opportunity for any region with the right characteristics to create its own sustainable tech cluster. But, as with any true democracy, it won’t happen without the combined participation of the community and desire of entrepreneurs to lead the movement. This is happening in Bend, and I look forward to hearing from others about your own experiments.

Lessons Learned:

  • Regional tech clusters can be engineered if …
    • the region has key attributes and a focused effort from the entrepreneurial and business community
  •  Opportunity exists for economic development in regions where tech clusters can be formed
    • potential to dramatically increase the growth of entrepreneurship and job creation in the region.
  • Entrepreneurs are the path to job creation and growth…
    • attract them, reduce the friction to growth, and do everything possible to cause the wealth created to recycle locally

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Early-stage Regional Venture Funds–part 2 of 3 of Bigger in Bend

Dino Vendetti a VC at Bay Partners, moved up to Bend, Oregon on a mission to engineer Bend into a regional technology cluster.  Over the years Dino and I brainstormed about how Lean entrepreneurship would affect regional development.

I visited Bend last year and caught up with his progress.

Mt-Bachelor-Ski-Resort

Today with every city, state and country trying to build out a technology cluster, following Dino’s progress can provide others with a roadmap of what’s worked and what has not.

Here’s Part 2 of Dino’s story…

——-

Tech investing is risky. Success depends on finding startups that have identified acute customer pains in large markets where conditions are ripe for a new entrant. Few entrepreneurs find this scalable and repeatable business model because it’s not easy. However, four critical advances over the past decade (cloud, accelerators, Lean, and Angels) not only changed the math for tech investing but made regional tech clusters possible.

  • The cloud, open-source development tools and web 2.0 as a distribution channel have vastly reduced the amount of capital a startup needs at the early stage when the risk is greatest. (Startups still need capital to scale once they find good product-market fit and a repeatable-scalable business model.)
  • Accelerators, which became mechanisms for focused entrepreneurship mentoring and delivery of best practices to startups. This was valuable to startups in the Valley and has been vital to startups in regions where the ecosystem is less developed.
  • The Lean Movement, led by Steve Blank (and others,) created a set of methodologies that ushered in the era of Evidence Based Entrepreneurship. This has changed the way entrepreneurs think about building their startups and how investors should look at them.
  • Angels & Crowdfunding: Coincident with the capital efficient movement came the current wave of angel investors, this time armed with the ability to collectively fund startups to the point of meaningful value creation on modest amounts of capital. Sites like AngelList have only amplified the collective reach of individual and grouped angel investors.

These four developments, while important to Silicon Valley, are vital to developing regional tech clusters. While the density of Silicon Valley startups can’t be replicated in regions, the barriers of money and resources have disappeared. These changes make entrepreneurship possible anywhere.

What’s Missing Is Early Stage Capital
While the technology gap is closing, what’s still missing in local regions is early stage capital.

Three types of regional venture funds exist today:

  • Regionally located funds, such as Foundry Group in Boulder, are located outside of Silicon Valley or NY but their investments are primarily in the Valley or NY… they are not a regional fund per this discussion.
  • Regional Angel funds that pool investors capital and typically make a one time investment in a startup, sometimes at an early stage but often at a slightly later stage.
  • Late stage large regionally based funds that invest in late stage or mezzanine deals.

Large regionally based early stage funds have mostly failed.  They failed due to:

  1. the dearth of deals in the region that have IPO potential and
  2. most of those funds were also raised and invested prior to the huge capital efficient wave of the past 6-8 years. These regional funds invested in capital-intensive startups that required large initial investments. The result was too much money in too few deals. The inevitable failures then damaged returns.

The Oregon startup scene today looks very different from what it did 10 years ago. Today it’s dominated by capital efficient software, web and mobile startups whereas 10 years ago it was dominated by semiconductor and hardware startups that consumed huge amounts of capital before their first dollar in revenue.

So a regional fund must do three things:

  • focus on early stage investments
  • “right sized” for the exit environment;
    • if it’s too big you won’t be able to intelligently deploy capital;
    • too small and you won’t be able to follow on and protect your investments or make enough investments to ensure you have enough “at bats.”
  • find and focus on the entrepreneurs and deals that want to build scalable startups

We believe that regional funds need to walk a delicate balance…but it doesn’t take huge IPOs to return multiples of capital on a small fund.

Why Valley Rules Don’t Work in Regional Economies
A typical VC fund in Silicon Valley might raise $200 -$400 million.  And over a 10-year life of a fund only one out of five deals will deliver all the returns.  A good return to your investors is 20% per year. That means over 10 years investors expect ~6x return on their investment. This means that those winning deals have to make a ~30x return to provide the venture capital fund that 20% compound return (the 6x).

The Valley strategy is to get as much money to work in the high flying deals that are going to pop….It’s an educated/calculated swing-for-the-fences model and it can work and be extremely lucrative if you can consistently get in those deals.

The problem for a regionally based investor is that there will be a limited number of startups in your region that have a realistic chance at an IPO. The percentage of VC backed startups that go public is very small, so counting on those exits in a regional fund would not be prudent (nice if it happens but don’t build the model to rely on it).

The reality is that the super vast majority of liquidity events are M&A and the majority of those are in the under $100M range. As a result, large multi-hundred million-dollar funds focused on early stage investing in the region can be challenging. There just aren’t enough “right” regional startups to invest in.

Regional Moneyball
Bend playing Moneyball makes a lot of sense. In fact, it’s the only game that investors in a regional cluster can play.  Regional investors need a way of improving their odds of getting base hits and minimize strikeouts.

Playing Moneyball in venture capital means making smaller, smarter bets focused on companies and deals that the big teams, the Silicon Valley heavyweight investors, pass up; because the deals are too far from Silicon Valley, not yet known to them, not in their comfort zone, or not the fad of the month.

Playing Moneyball also means playing with the money you have.  The reality for a regional investor is that you have to match the capital you raise to the deal/exit environment you are in.

Specifically this means that a regional fund should be $10-30M. (With a portfolio of at least 20 investments, or you are at risk of the adverse selection problem.) And the fund should be looking at startups that can provide $20M to $100M exits – almost certainly as M&A deals.

The chart below diagrams our regional fund strategy.

Funds for Regional Markets

The good news for regional investors is that these factors allow you to play Moneyball if (and that’s a big IF) you are investing in entrepreneurs who are living and breathing evidence-based entrepreneurship and who are building scalable startups. This is true whether the company is concept stage or ramping revenue. I’ve found a lot of companies in the region that have found a way to get to some level of revenue traction but haven’t broken out. When you dig in, the reasons are usually easily discoverable and observable.

The Bend Experience
One of the fundamental benefits of being so active in building the FoundersPad accelerator (a 12-week, Lean Startup program focused on customer development) is working with the cohort participants on refining their business models. This experience has provided me a whole new set of pattern matching filters as an investor.

The business model canvas and the customer development process provide investors an incredible opportunity to evaluate how deeply an entrepreneur has engaged with their target customers and, more importantly, what they have learned about the problem-solution space they are going after. This learning and the measurements and metrics that surround it is what evidence based entrepreneurship is all about and what makes it a powerful tool for entrepreneurs, investors and accelerators.

If you are a regional accelerator or investor and would like to talk and compare notes please feel free to email me.

Lessons Learned

  • Regions are missing early-stage capital.
  • Valley-sized VC funds don’t work.
  • Build $10-30M funds.
  • Look for $20-100M exits.
  • Focus on capital efficient, scalable startups and founders

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Bigger in Bend – Building a Regional Startup Cluster–part 1 of 3

When Customer Development and the Lean Startup were just a sketch on the napkin, Dino Vendetti, a VC at Bay Partners, was one of the first venture capitalists I shared my ideas with.

Dino and I kept in touch as he moved up to Bend, Oregon on a mission to engineer Bend into a regional technology cluster.  Over the years we brainstormed about how Lean entrepreneurship would affect regional development.

I visited Bend last year and caught up with his progress.

This post and the two that follow highlight what Dino has learned about the characteristics of the startup and investing landscape in a regional market, and what it takes to intentionally engineer a thriving regional tech cluster.

Today, with every city, state and country trying to build out a technology cluster, following Dino’s progress can provide others with a roadmap of what’s worked and what has not. Bend, Oregon is an ideal case study because of its size, location and entrepreneurial characteristics.

Here’s Part 1 of Dino’s story…

———

Let’s get right to the point… I fell in love with Bend, Oregon, once a sleepy logging town, now population 79,000. If you like skiing, hiking, biking, rafting, golfing, camping, fishing, picnicking, rock climbing, and startups – you’d like Bend.1_BalloonsOverBend_2

Before moving to Bend last year, my career took me from engineering development roles at defense contractors in the 80’s to product management and executive marketing roles in companies like Qualcomm in the 90’s, to the world of venture capital at several firms including Bay Partners, Formative Ventures and Vulcan Ventures.

After several visits skiing here, I had become smitten with the “mojo” of Bend – its superb quality of life, recreational opportunities and proximity to the San Francisco Bay Area. The vibe of Bend is appealing, unique and unpretentious given the number of successful business, tech and professional athlete transplants who call it home. It’s home to a small but growing tech community that has been developing over the past decade, and that’s what piqued my interest.

What’s Different
The differences between the Bend, Oregon region and Silicon Valley are obvious. The sheer density of talent, companies, capital and universities that exist in the Valley are second to none. It truly is the epicenter of the startup world and it’s the regional cluster for innovation and entrepreneurship. Working in the Valley, I took for granted the constant and real time networking opportunities, the volume of deals, and the ability to access nearly every corner of the tech industry – no surprise to anyone who has spent any time in the Valley.

However, what I found in Bend was a deeply entrepreneurial community that is leaps and bounds beyond just a destination resort town. Bend fights way above its weight class and is professional scale for its size. Its ability to do so is tied to the deep entrepreneurial DNA that permeates the region (a very similar characteristic to Silicon Valley), originally out of necessity and now out of strategy.

Job creation in Bend is everyone’s business.   People who make the move typically need to start a business to have a job. Bend is the 16th largest metro area in the country for high-tech startup density. Pretty amazing for a town with fewer than 100,000 people.

Startups in Bend
So what types of entrepreneurs and startups exist in Bend?  There’s a concentration around several sectors: software, hardware, medical-technology, aviation, and a specialty of Oregon – craft beer brewing. The chart below shows the clustering of startups around these sectors.

Bend Startup Ecosystem

Bend Startup Ecosystem

In addition to the four major data centers that include Facebook and Apple, Bend currently boasts 95 startups across multiple technologynsectors: 47 software, 26 hardware/semi and 22 med tech related startups. Nearby Portland Oregon (just 160 miles away) is home to over 300 startups; between the two markets, nearly 80 new startups are forming each year.

Silicon Valley Transplants
In addition to local entrepreneurs building startups, I found something else I wasn’t expecting in Bend: a deep pool of talented Valley transplants who’ve made their way to Bend – either during their careers or after. There are retired Fortune 500 CEOs, senior execs from Valley startups and public companies as well as successful entrepreneurs who exited their companies. These smart, successful transplants have gotten involved with the local business community as mentors, advisors, entrepreneurs, or investors.

But the real surprise was learning that for some Bend is a Silicon Valley bedroom community. A daily direct flight on United can have you in your Bay Area office by 8 a.m. Monday. Every week I meet someone new who just moved to Bend and commutes to work for Google, Facebook, Salesforce, Oracle, Marketo, Workday, and on and on….These people are important and useful in the engineering of a tech cluster; as startup coaches, angel investors and advocates for the community. They communicate and pass on the DNA of how Silicon Valley operates and what level of performance is needed to compete on a global scale.

Entrepreneurs in Bend
Within the Bend tech startup community I found three kinds of startups/entrepreneurs:

  • Scalable entrepreneurs similar to those you would find in Silicon Valley (although a smaller concentration exists in Bend). These entrepreneurs want to build a big company. They’re typically Silicon Valley transplants who had enough success and experience to know what they were getting themselves into, what it means to raise capital from investors, what it means to scale a company, and how to engineer an exit.
  • Viable entrepreneurs who think they are building scalable startups but lack either a key element of their business model and/or lack the right team DNA to “go for it..” In this region, these are the majority of new startups I see. They have two limitations, which I help coach to see if they have the capability and desire to become scalable.
    • They go after a market opportunity that’s too limited to result in a truly scalable business (still might be an M&A candidate, but at the lower end of the range).
    • Most teams have a reluctance and willingness to “go for it” when they finally do have a scalable business and have validated the key aspects of their business model. This “small business” mindset is a holdover of how capital starved early stage startups are/were in Oregon. Entrepreneurs (and angel investors) prioritize profitability over growth (this is OK for lifestyle startups, but not for scalable startups where capturing market share and thought leadership is vital).
  • Lifestyle entrepreneurs who are just building a business to make a profit and support their awesome lifestyle (Bend has a lot of these). There is nothing wrong with lifestyle entrepreneurs as they are providing valuable products and services to the local/regional economy, but these do not make for good venture or angel investments under the traditional equity based venture model.

Regional entrepreneurs are at an inherent disadvantage in getting the attention of customers and late stage VCs.  Therefore they need to focus on building the most efficiently scalable business model possible. Without focus, it’s difficult to create enough signal to noise ratio to become relevant in their market segment. The good news is that whether you are an investor or accelerator, if your startup is located in an advantageous regional market (defined below) and if you apply lean methodologies, you can improve your on-base and slugging percentage.

The opportunity and challenge in regional markets is to:

  • Educate the ecosystem about the differences between the three kinds of startups/entrepreneurs
  • Find, nurture and invest in the truly scalable startups and entrepreneurs, as they will be the ones that have the potential to deliver outsized returns

Fixing the Missing Pieces of Infrastructure
The evolution of very capital efficient business models and Lean Startup methodologies has led to easier paths to funding, launching and growing businesses. With a tech cluster developing in Bend, it was clear that there were four missing pieces in its infrastructure.

I decided to fix each of them.

Bend needed a startup accelerator.  While entrepreneurship in Bend was talked about, and everyone read the same blogs, there was no central place founders could get focused and intense coaching and mentorship. So I co-founded the FoundersPad accelerator, a 12-week, Lean Startup program focused on customer development that helps founders develop, refine and grow their business.

Founders Pad

Founders Pad

Bend needed its own venture firm. While Silicon Valley and New York are magnets for great startups, our bet is that awesome startups exist in (or can be attracted to) Oregon and Northern California. So I launched Seven Peaks Ventures with a team of investors that includes some of the region’s most active angel investors. We help Oregon-based startups build and scale their businesses by providing highly relevant mentoring and leveraging our deep network in Silicon Valley and beyond.

Bend needs to attract more entrepreneurs. So I launched The Big Bend Theory with Bruce Cleveland.  We’ll fly founders and their spouses/significant others along with a team member to Bend to meet local startup executives and community leaders and experience the lifestyle. If they choose to relocate in Bend we’ll offer free temporary office space and help get them funded.

Oregon State University’s new Bend campus didn’t have a Computer Science or User Experience design program.  So I helped develop the Computer Science program at Oregon State. (We’re looking for Computer Science professors, so email me if you want to live and teach in Bend!)

Lessons Learned

  • Bend is a bet on a regional tech cluster
  • To build a successful regional cluster, look for an eco-system with:
    • experienced professionals willing to mentor
    • entrepreneurs with the energy and drive to build businesses
    • viable startups under development
  • We are engineering the infrastructure that lacks: accelerator, venture firm, outreach, university and training.
  • It is critical to understand the types of startups and entrepreneurs in your region and for venture funding
  • Seek out the truly scalable startups.

Listen to the blog post here



Download the podcast here

Lessons Learned in Diagnostics

This post is part of our series on the National Science Foundation I-Corps Lean LaunchPad class in Life Science and Health Care at UCSF. Doctors, researchers and Principal Investigators in this class got out of the lab and hospital talked to 2,355 customers, tested 947 hypotheses and invalidated 423 of them. The class had 1,145 engagements with instructors and mentors. (We kept track of all this data by instrumenting the teams with LaunchPad Central software.)

Mira Medicine is one of the 26 teams in the class. The team members are:
  • Pierre-Antoine Gourraud – PhD, MPH UCSF neuroscientist and c0-leader of the MS BioScreen project
  • Jason Crane - PhD UCSF Manager Scientific Software Development
  • Raphaelle Loren - Managing Director – Health Practice at the Innovation Management Institute

Todd Morrill was the diagnostics cohort instructor. Matt Cooper CEO of Carmenta BioSciences was the Mira Medicine team mentor.

Multiple Sclerosis - MS
Multiple Sclerosis – MS – is an immune system disease that attacks the myelin, the fatty sheath that surrounds and protects nerve fibers of the central nervous system (brain, spinal cord, and optic nerve). T-cells, (a type of white blood cell in the immune system,) become sensitized to myelin and cross the blood-brain barrier into the central nervous system (CNS). Once in the CNS, these T-cells injure myelin, and secrete chemicals that damage nerve fibers (axons) and recruit more damaging immune cells to the site of inflammation. multiple sclerosis and therapeutic targets

There are currently ten FDA approved MS medications for use in relapsing forms of MS. None of these drugs is a cure, and no drug is approved to treat the type of MS that shows steady progression at onset. MS disease management decisions are complex and requires a patients neurologist to figure out what drugs to use.

Mira Medicine and Multiple Sclerosis
The team came to class with the thought of commercializing the UCSF Multiple Sclerosis BioScreen Project a Precision Medicine application that integrates a patients medical records with the latest population-based data from hundreds of other Multiple Sclerosis patients, (including their 3D MRI scans,) and using predictive algorithms makes it possible to chart a unique course of treatment for each patient. (Mira Medicine team member Pierre-Antoine Gourraud was the project co-leader.) MS BioScreen

Mira wanted to commercialize the UCSF Multiple Sclerosis Bioscreen project and to add additional neurological diseases which require multiple types of data  (including biomarkers, clinical, and imaging). They wanted to help medical centers and large providers assess disease progression to guide therapeutic decision-making.  Over the course of the class Mira Medicine team spoke to over 80 customers, partners and payers.

Here’s their 2 minute video summary

If you can’t see the video above, click here.

Then reality hit. First, the team found that their Multiple Sclerosis Bioscreen application (which they used as their MVP) was just a “nice-to-have”, not a “must-have”. In fact, the “must have features” were their future predictive algorithms. Next, they found that if their tool can enable a diagnosis, (even without claiming it could) then it was likely that the FDA would require a  510(k) medical device clearance. Then they found to get reimbursed they need a CPT code (and they had to decide whether to code stack - using multiple codes for “one” diagnosis, and thereby getting multiple reimbursements for one test. (The rules have changed so that code stacking is hard or impossible), Or get a new CPT code, or use miscellaneous code.) To get a new CPT and a 510(k) they would have to perform a some sort of clinical study. At a minimum a 1-year prospective study (a study to see if the neurologists using the application had patients with a better outcome then those who didn’t have access to the app). Getting approval to use an existing (aka old) CPT code means showing equivalence to an existing dx process or test, and the requirements are code-specific. Finally, to get access to data sources of other MS patients they would need to have HIPPA Business Associate Agreement.

Watch their Lessons Learned video below and find out how they pivoted and what happened.

If you can’t see the video above click here

Look at their Lesson Learned slides below If you can’t see the presentation above, click here

Lessons Learned

  • Researchers and PI’s come in believing “My science/project/data are so good that people will immediately see the value and be willing to pay for it.  It will “sell itself”.
  • A business is much more than just good science: it is about customers seeing value and being willing to pay and proper validation and reimbursement coding and
  • A successful business is the sum (and integration!) of all the parts of the business model canvas.
    • It includes reimbursement, regulation, IP, validation, channel access, etc.

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Lessons Learned in Therapeutics

This post is part of our series on the National Science Foundation I-Corps Lean LaunchPad class in Life Science and Health Care at UCSF. Doctors, researchers and Principal Investigators in this class got out of the lab and hospital talked to 2,355 customers, tested 947 hypotheses and invalidated 423 of them. The class had 1,145 engagements with instructors and mentors. (We kept track of all this data by instrumenting the teams with LaunchPad Central software.)

We are redefining how translational medicine is practiced.

Traditional view of translational medicineWe’ve learned that translational medicine is not just about the science.

More on this in future blog posts.

Lean view of translational medicine

Vitruvian Therapeutics is one of the 26 teams in the class. The team members are:
  • Dr. Hobart Harris  Chief of  General Surgery, Vice-Chair of the Department of Surgery, and a Professor of Surgery at  UCSF.
  • Dr. David Young,  Professor of Plastic Surgery at UCSF. His area of expertise includes wound healing, microsurgery, and reconstruction after burns and trauma. 
  • Cindy Chang is a Enzymologist investigating novel enzymes involved in biofuel and chemical synthesis in microbes at LS9

Karl Handelsman was the therapeutics cohort instructor. Julie Cherrington CEO of Pathway Therapeutics was the team mentor.

Vitruvian Therapeutics is trying to solve the Incisional hernia problem. An incisional hernia happens in open abdominal surgery when the area of the wound doesnt heal properly and bulges outward. This requires a second operation to fix the hernia.Ventral Herniaincisional hernia

Hobart Harris’s insight was what was needed wasn’t one more new surgical technique or device to repair the hernias, but something to prevent the hernia from occurring in the first place. Vitruvian Therapeutics first product, MyoSeal, does just that. It promotes wound repair via biocompatible microparticles plus a fibrin tissue sealant. So far in 300 rats it’s been shown to prevent incisional hernias through enhanced wound healing.

Here’s their 2 minute video summary

If you can’t see the video above, click here.

Two weeks into the class and interviews with 14 of their potential customers (surgeons) reality intruded on their vision of how the world should work. We happened to catch that moment in class in this 90 second clip.

Watch  and find out how talking to just the first 14 customers in the Lean LaunchPad class saved Hobart Harris and the Vitruvian Therapeutics team years.

If you can’t see the clip above click here.

The Vitruvian Therapeutics Lessons Learned Presentation is a real-eyeopener. Given that this product could solve the incisional hernia problem, Hobart and his team naturally assumed that insurance companies would embrace this and their fellow surgeons viewed the problem as they did and would leap at using the product. Boy were they in for a surprise. After talking to 74 surgeons, insurance companies and partners appeared that no one – insurance companies or surgeons – owned the problem. Listen to their conclusions 8-weeks after the first video.

Watch the video and find out how they pivoted and what happened.

Don’t miss Karl Handelsman comments on their Investment Readiness Level at the end. Vitruvian is a good example of a great early stage therapeutics idea with animal data missing and many key components of the business model still needed to verify.

If you can’t see the video above click here

Look at their Lesson Learned slides below

If you can’t see the presentation above, click here

Market Type
During the class the Vitruvian Therapeutics class struggled with the classic question of visionaries: are we creating a New Market (one which doesn’t exist and has no customers)? In Vitruvian’s case preventive measures to stop incisional hernias before they happen.  Or should we position our product as one that’s Resegmenting an Existing Market? i.e. reducing leakage rates.  Or is there a way to get proof that the vision of the New Market is the correct path.

When Hobart Harris of Viturvian asked, “… what if you’re a visionary, and no one but you sees the right solution to a problem” we had a great in-class dialog. Karl Handelsman‘s comments at 3:15 and 4:16 and Allan May at 4:35 were incredibly valuable. See the video below for the dialog.

If you can’t see the video above, click here

Further Reading

Lessons Learned

  • Principal Investigators, scientists and engineers can’t figure out commercialization sitting in their labs
  • You can’t outsource commercialization to a proxy (consultants, market researchers, etc.)
  • Experiential Learning is integral to commercialization
  • You may be the smartest person in your lab, but your are not smarter than the collective intelligence of your potential customers, partners, payers and regulators

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Moneyball and the Investment Readiness Level-video

Eric Ries was kind enough to invite me to speak at his Lean Startup Conference.

In the talk I reviewed the basic components of the Lean Startup and described how we teach it. I observed that now that we’ve built software to instrument and monitor the progress of new ventures (using LaunchPad Central), that we are entering the world of evidence-based entrepreneurship and the Investment Readiness Level.

This video is a companion to the blog post here. Read it for context.

If you can’t see the video above, click here

You can follow the talk along using the slides below

If you can’t see the slides above, click here

Additional videos here

Startup Tools here

Listen the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Lessons Learned in Medical Devices

This post is part of our series on the National Science Foundation I-Corps Lean LaunchPad class in Life Science and Health Care at UCSF. Doctors, researchers and Principal Investigators in this class got out of the lab and hospital talked to 2,355 customers, tested 947 hypotheses and invalidated 423 of them.  The class had 1,145 engagements with instructors and mentors. (We kept track of all this data by instrumenting the teams with LaunchPad Central software.)

We are redefining how translational medicine is practiced. It’s Lean, it’s fast, it works and it’s unlike anything else ever done.

—–

Sometimes teams win when they fail.

Knox Medical Devices was building a Spacer which contained a remote monitoring device to allow for intervention for children with Asthma . (A Spacer is a tube between a container of Asthma medicine (in an inhaler) and a patient’s mouth.The tube turns the Asthma medicine into an aerosol.)Asthma

Knox’s spacer had sensors for basic spirometry measurements (the amount of air and how fast it’s inhaled and exhaled) to see how well the lung is working. It also had a Nitrous Oxide sensor to provide data on whether the lungs airways are inflamed, an inhaler attachment and a GPS tracking device.

Knox SpacerThe Spacer hardware was paired with data analysis software for tracking multiple facets of asthma patients.

The Knox team members are:

Allan May founder of Life Science Angels was the Medical Device cohort instructor. Alex DiNello CEO at Relievant Medsystems was their mentor.

The Knox team was a great mix of hands-on device engineers and business development. They used agile engineering perfectly to continually test variants of their Minimum Viable Product (MVP’s) in front of customers often and early to get immediate feedback.

Knox was relentless about understanding whether their device was a business or whether it was technology in search of a market. In 10 weeks they had face-to-face meetings with 117 customers, tested 33 hypotheses, invalidated 19 of them and 53 instructor and mentor interactions.

Here’s Knox Medical’s 2 minute video summary

If you can’t see the video above, click here

Knox was a great example of having a technology in search of a customer. The initial hypothesis of who would pay for the device – parents of children with asthma – was wrong and resulted in Knox’s first pivot in week 4. By week 6 they had discovered that; 1) Peak Flow Meters are not as heavily prescribed as they thought, 2) Insurance company reimbursement is necessary for anything upwards of $15, 3) Nitrous Oxide testing isn’t currently used to measure asthma conditions.

After the pivot they the found that the most likely users of their device would be low income Asthma patients who are treated at Asthma clinics funded by federal, state or county dollars. These clinics reduce hospitalization but Insurers weren’t paying to cover clinic costs nor would they cover the use of the Knox device. The irony was that those who most needed the Knox device were those who could least afford it and wouldn’t be able get it.

Watch their Lesson Learned presentation below. Listen to the comments from Allan May the Device instructor at the end.

If you can’t see the video above, click here

In the end Knox, like a lot of startups in Life Science and Health Care, discovered that they had a multi-sided market.  They realized late in the class the patients (and their families) were not their payers - their payers were the insurance companies (and the patients were the users.)  If they didn’t have a compelling value proposition for the insurers (cost savings, increased revenue, etc.) it didn’t matter how great the technology was or how much the patients would benefit.

The Knox Medical Device presentation slides are below. Don’t miss the evolution of their business model canvas in the appendix. It’s a film strip of the entrepreneurial process in action.

If you can’t see the slides above, click here

Knox is a great example of how the Lean LaunchPad allows teams to continually test hypotheses and fail fast and inexpensively. They learned a ton. And saved millions.

Lessons Learned

  • In medical devices, understanding reimbursement, regulation and IP is critical
  • Sometimes teams win when they fail
Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

Lessons Learned in Digital Health

This post is part of our series on the National Science Foundation I-Corps Lean LaunchPad class in Life Science and Health Care at UCSF.

Our Lean LaunchPad for Life Science class talked to 2,355 customers, tested 947 hypotheses and invalidated 423 of them.  They had 1,145 engagements with instructors and mentors. (We kept track of all this data by instrumenting the teams with LaunchPad Central software.)

This post is one of a series of the “Lessons Learned” presentations and videos from our class.

Sometimes a startup results from a technical innovation. Or from a change in regulation, declining costs, changes in consumers needs or an insight about customer needs. Resultcare, one of the 26 teams in the class started when a resident in clinical medicine at UCSF watched her mother die of breast cancer and her husband get critically injured.

The team members are:

  • Dr. Mima Geere  Clinical Medicine at UCSF.
  • Dr. Arman Jahangiri HHMI medical fellow at UCSF, Department of Neurological Surgery
  • Dr. Brandi Castro in Neuroscience at UCSF
  • Mitchell Geere product design
  • Kristen Bova MBA, MHS
  • Nima Anari PhD in Data Science

Abhas Gupta was the Digital Health cohort instructor. Richard Caro was their mentor.

ResultCare is a mobile app that helps physicians take the guesswork out of medicine. It enables physicians to practice precision medicine while reducing costs.precision medicine

Here’s Resultcare’s 2 minute video summary

If you can’t see the video above, click here.

Watch their Lesson Learned presentation below. The first few minutes of the talk is quite personal and describes the experiences that motivated Dr. Geere to address this problem.

If you can’t see the video above, click here

The Resultcare presentation slides are below.

If you can’t see the presentation above, click here

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

We’ve seen the Future of Translational Medicine and it’s Disruptive

A team of 110 researchers and clinicians, in therapeutics, diagnostics, devices and digital health in 25 teams at UCSF, has just shown us the future of translational medicine.  It’s Lean, it’s fast, it works and it’s unlike anything else ever done.

It’s going to get research from the lab to the bedside cheaper and faster.

Welcome to the Lean LaunchPad for Life Sciences and Healthcare (part of the National Science Foundation I-Corps).

This post is part of our series on the Lean Startup in Life Science and Health Care.

——–

Our class talked to 2,355 customers, tested 947 hypotheses and invalidated 423 of them.  They had 1,145 engagements with instructors and mentors. (We kept track of all this data by instrumenting the teams with LaunchPad Central software.)

In a packed auditorium in Genentech Hall at UCSF, the teams summarized what they learned after 10 weeks of getting out of the building. This was our version of Demo Day – we call it “Lessons Learned” Day. Each team make two presentations:

  • 2 minutes YouTube Video: General story of what they learned from the class
  • 8 minute Lessons Learned Presentation: Very specific story about what they learned in 10 weeks about their business model

In the next few posts I’m going to share a few of the final “Lessons Learned” presentations and videos and then summarize lessons learned from the teaching team.

Magnamosis
Magnamosis is a medical device company that has a new way to create a magnetic compression anastomosis (a surgical connection between two tubular structures like the bowel) with improved outcomes.

anastomosis

Team Members were: Michael Harrison (the father of fetal surgery), Michael Danty, Dillon Kwiat, Elisabeth Leeflang, Matt Clark.  Jay Watkins was the team mentor. Allan May and George Taylor were the medical device cohort instructors.

Their initial idea was that making an anastomosis that’s better, faster and cheaper will have surgeons fighting to the death to get a hold of their device.  magnamosisThey quickly found out that wasn’t the case.  Leak rates turned out to a bigger issue with surgeons and a much larger market.

Here’s their 2 minute video summary

If you can’t see the video above, click here.

Watch their Lessons Learned video below and see how a team of doctors learned about product/market fit, channels and pricing.

If you can’t see the video above, click here

Their slide deck is below. Don’t miss the evolution of their business model in the Appendix.

If you can’t see the presentation above, click here

The best summary of why Scientists, Engineers and Principal Investigators need to get out of the building was summarized by Dr. Harrison below. After working on his product for a decade listen to how 10 weeks of the Lean LaunchPad class radically changed his value proposition and business model.

If you can’t see the video above, click here.

For further reading:

Listen to the blog post here


Download the podcast here

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