Steve Blank

This post previously appeared in Defense News  and C4SIR.

Despite the clear and present danger of threats from China and elsewhere, there’s no agreement on what types of adversaries we’ll face; how we’ll fight, organize, and train; and what weapons or systems we’ll need for future fights. Instead, developing a new doctrine to deal with these new issues is fraught with disagreements, differing objectives, and incumbents who defend the status quo. Yet change in military doctrine is coming. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks is navigating the tightrope of competing interests to make it happen – hopefully in time.

From left, Skydio CEO Adam Bry demonstrates the company’s autonomous systems technology for Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks and Doug Beck, director of the Defense Innovation Unit, during a visit to the company’s facility in San Mateo, Calif. (Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza/U.S. Navy)

There are several theories of how innovation in military doctrine and new operational concepts occur. Some argue new doctrine emerges when civilians intervene to assist military “mavericks,” e.g., the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Or a military service can generate innovation internally when senior military officers recognize the doctrinal and operational implications of new capabilities, e.g., Rickover and the Nuclear Navy.

But today, innovation in doctrine and concepts is driven by four major external upheavals that simultaneously threaten our military and economic advantage:

1. China delivering multiple asymmetric offset strategies.
2. China fielding naval, space and air assets in unprecedented numbers.
3. The proven value of a massive number of attritable uncrewed systems on the Ukrainian battlefield.
4. Rapid technological change in artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, space, biotechnology, semiconductors, hypersonics, etc, with many driven by commercial companies in the U.S. and China.

The Need for Change
The U.S. Department of Defense traditional sources of innovation (primes, FFRDCs, service labs) are no longer sufficient by themselves to keep pace.

The speed, depth and breadth of these disruptive changes happen faster than the responsiveness and agility of our current acquisition systems and defense-industrial base. However, in the decade since these external threats emerged, the DoD’s doctrine, organization, culture, process, and tolerance for risk mostly operated as though nothing substantial needed to change.

The result is that the DoD has world-class people and organizations for a world that no longer exists.

It isn’t that the DoD doesn’t know how to innovate on the battlefield. In Iraq and Afghanistan innovative crisis-driven organizations appeared, such as the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force. And armed services have bypassed their own bureaucracy by creating rapid capabilities offices. Even today, the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine rapidly delivers weapons.

Unfortunately, these efforts are siloed and ephemeral, disappearing when the immediate crisis is over. They rarely make permanent change at the DoD.

Bu in the past year several signs of meaningful change show that the DoD is serious about changing how it operates and radically overhauling its doctrine, concepts, and weapons.

First, the Defense Innovation Unit was elevated to report to the of defense secretary. Previously hobbled with a $35 million budget and buried inside the research and engineering organization, its budget and reporting structure were signs of how little the DoD viewed the importance of commercial innovation.

Now, with DIU rescued from obscurity, its new director Doug Beck chairs the Deputy’s Innovation Steering Group, which oversees defense efforts to rapidly field high-tech capabilities to address urgent operational problems. DIU also put staff in the Navy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to discover actual urgent needs.

Furthermore, the House Appropriations Committee signaled the importance of DIU with a proposed a fiscal 2024 budget of $1 billion to fund these efforts. And the Navy has signaled, through the creation of the Disruptive Capabilities Office, that it intends to fully participate with DIU.

In addition, Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks unveiled the Replicator initiative, meant to deploy thousands of attritable autonomous systems (i.e. drones – in the air, water and undersea) within the next 18 to 24 months. The initiative is the first test of the Deputy’s Innovation Steering Group’s ability to deliver autonomous systems to warfighters at speed and scale while breaking down organizational barriers. DIU will work with new companies to address anti-access/area denial problems.

Replicator is a harbinger of fundamental DoD doctrinal changes as well as a solid signal to the defense-industrial base that the DoD is serious about procuring components faster, cheaper and with a shorter shelf life.

Finally, at the recent Reagan National Defense Forum, the world felt like it turned upside down. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin talked about DIU in his keynote address and came to Reagan immediately following a visit to its headquarters in Silicon Valley, where he met with innovative companies. On many panels, high-ranking officers and senior defense officials used the words “disruption,” “innovation,” “speed” and “urgency” so many times, signaling they really meant it and wanted it.

In the audience were a plethora of venture and private capital fund leaders looking for ways to build companies that would deliver innovative capabilities with speed.

Conspicuously, unlike in previous years, sponsor banners at the conference were not the incumbent prime contractors but rather insurgents – new potential primes like Palantir and Anduril. The DoD has woken up. It has realized new and escalating threats require rapid change, or we may not prevail in the next conflict.

Change is hard, especially in military doctrine. (Ask the Marines.) Incumbent suppliers don’t go quietly into the night, and new suppliers almost always underestimate the difficulty and complexity of a task. Existing organizations defend their budget, headcount, and authority. Organization saboteurs resist change. But adversaries don’t wait for our decades-out plans.

But More Can Be Done

• Congress and the military services can support change by fully funding the Replicator initiative and the Defense Innovation Unit.
• The services have no procurement budget for Replicator, and they’ll have to shift existing funds to unmanned and AI programs.
• The DoD should turn its new innovation process into actual, substantive orders for new companies.
• And other combatant commands should follow what INDOPACOM is doing.
• In addition, defense primes should more often aggressively partner with startups.

Change is in the air. Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks is building a coalition of the willing to get it done.

Here’s to hoping it happens in time.

Filed under: National Security | 1 Comment »

This article previously appeared in The National Interest.

Last month the U.S. passed the CHIPS and Science Act, one of the first pieces of national industrial policy – government planning and intervention in a specific industry — in the last 50 years, in this case for semiconductors. After the celebratory champagne has been drunk and the confetti floats to the ground it’s helpful to put the CHIPS Act in context and understand the work that government and private capital have left to do.

Today the United States is in great power competition with China. It’s a contest over which nation’s diplomatic, information, military and economic system will lead the world in the 21st century. And the result is whether we face a Chinese dystopian future or a democratic one, where individuals and nations get to make their own choices. At the heart of this contest is leadership in emerging and disruptive technologies – running the gamut from semiconductors and supercomputers to biotech and blockchain and everything in between.

National Industrial Policy – U.S. versus China
Unlike the U.S., China manages its industrial policy via top-down 5-year plans. Their overall goal is to turn China into a technologically advanced and militarily powerful state that can challenge U.S. commercial and military leadership. Unlike the U.S., China has embraced the idea that national security is inexorably intertwined with commercial technology (semiconductors, drones, AI, machine learning, autonomy, biotech, cyber, semiconductors, quantum, high-performance computing, commercial access to space, et al.)  They’ve made what they call military/civil fusion – building a dual-use ecosystem by tightly coupling their commercial technology companies with their defense ecosystem.

China has used its last three 5-year plans to invest in critical technologies (semiconductors, supercomputers, Al/ML, quantum, access to space, biotech.) as a national priority. They have built a sophisticated public/private financing ecosystem to support these plans. The Chinese technology funding ecosystem includes regional investment funds that exceed 700 billion dollars (what they call their Civil/Military Guidance Funds). These are investment vehicles in which central and local government agencies make investments that are combined with private venture capital and State-Owned Enterprises in areas of strategic importance. They are tightly coupling critical civilian companies to their defense ecosystem to help them develop military weapons and strategic surprises. (Tai Ming Cheung’s book is the best description of the system.)

The U.S. has nothing comparable.

In contrast, for the last several decades, planning in the U.S. economy was left to “the market.” Driven by economic theory from the Chicago School of Economics, its premise is that free markets best allocate resources in an economy and that minimal, or even no, government intervention is best for economic prosperity. We ran our economy on this theory as a bipartisan experiment in the U.S. for the last several decades. Optimizing profit above else led to wholesale offshoring of manufacturing and entire industries in order to lower costs. Investors shifted to making massive investments in industries with the quickest and greatest returns without long-term capital investments (e.g. social media, ecommerce, gaming) instead of in hardware, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation infrastructure, etc. The result was that by default, private equity and venture capital were the de facto decision makers of U.S. industrial policy.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the U.S. as the sole superpower, this “profits first” strategy was “good enough” as there was no other nation that could match our technical superiority. That changed when we weren’t paying attention.

China’s Ambition and Strategic Surprises
In the first two decades of the 21st century, while the U.S. was focused on combating non-nation states (ISIS, Al-Qaeda…) U.S. policymakers failed to understand China’s size, scale, ambition, and national commitment to surpass the U.S. as the global leader in technology. Not just in “a” technology but in all of those that are critical to both our national and economic security in this century.

China’s top-down national industrial policy means we are being out-planned, outmanned, and outspent. By some estimates, China could be the leader in a number of critical technology areas sooner than we think. While Chinese investment in technology at times has been redundant and wasteful, the sum of these tech investments has resulted in a series of strategic surprises to the U.S.– hypersonics, ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads as aircraft carrier killers, fractional orbital bombardment systems, rapid advances in space, semiconductors, supercomputers, and biotech …with more surprises likely – all with the goal to gain superiority over the U.S. both commercially and militarily.

Limits and Obstacles to China’s Dominance
However, America has advantages that China lacks: capital markets that can be incented not coerced, untapped innovation talent willing to help, labor markets that can be upskilled, university and corporate research that still excels, etc. At the same time, a few cracks are showing in China’s march to technology supremacy; their detention of some of their most successful entrepreneurs and investors, a crackdown on “superfluous” tech (gaming, online tutoring) and a slowdown of listings on the China’s version of NASDAQ, the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s STAR Market – may signal that the party is reining in its “anything goes” approach to pass the U.S.  Simultaneously the U.S. Commerce department has begun to prohibit export of critical equipment and components that China has needed to build their tech ecosystem.

Billionaires and Venture Capital Funding Defense Innovation
In the U.S. DoD’s traditional suppliers of defense tools, technologies, and weapons – the prime contractors and federal labs – are no longer the leaders in many of these emerging and disruptive  technologies.  And while the Department of Defense has world-class people and organizations it’s for a world that no longer exists. (Its inability to rapidly acquire and deploy commercial systems requires an organizational redesign on the scale of Goldwater/Nichols Act, not a reform.)

Technology innovation in many areas now falls to commercial companies. In lieu of a coherent U.S. national investment strategy across emerging and disruptive technologies (think of the CHIPS Act times ten), billionaires in the U.S. have started their own initiatives – Elon Musk – SpaceX and Starlink (reusable rockets and space-based broadband internet), Palmer Lucky –  Anduril (AI and Machine Learning for defense), Peter Theil – Palantir (data analytics). And in the last few years a series of defense-focused venture funds – Shield Capital, Lux Capital, and others – have emerged.

However, depending on billionaires interested in defense is not a sustainable strategy, and venture capital invests in businesses that can become profitable in 10 years or less. This means that technologies that might take decades to mature (fusion, activities in space, new industrial processes, …) get caught up and die in a “Valley of Death.” Attempts to bridge this Valley of Death often find technology companies relying on Government capital. These programs (DIU, In-Q-Tel, AFWERX, et al), are limited in scope, time and success at scale. These government investment programs have largely failed to scale these emerging and disruptive technologies for four reasons:

• Government agencies have limited access to top investment talent to help them make sophisticated technical investment decisions
• Government agencies lack the commercialization skills to help founders turn technical ideas into commercial ventures.
• While the Dept of Defense has encouraged starting new ventures, it has failed to match it with the acquisition dollars to scale them. There’s no DoD coherent/committed strategy to create a new generation of prime contractors around these emerging and disruptive technologies.
• No private or government funds operates as “patient capital” – investing in critical deep technologies that may take more than a decade to mature and scale

America’s Frontier Fund
Today one private capital fund is attempting to solve this problem. Gilman Louie, the founder of In-Q-Tel, has started America’s Frontier Fund (AFF.) This new fund will invest in key critical deep technologies to help the U.S. keep pace with the Chinese onslaught of capital focused on this area. AFF plans to raise one billion dollars in “patient private capital” from both public and private sources and to be entirely focused on identifying critical technologies and strategic investing. Setting up their fund as a non-profit allows them to focus on long-term investments for the country, not just what’s expedient to maximize profits. It will ensure these investments grow into large commercial and dual-use companies focused on the national interest.

They’ve built an extraordinary team of experienced venture capitalists (I’ve known Gilman Louie and Steve Weinstein for decades), a world-class chief scientist, a startup incubation team, and they come with a unique and deep understanding of the intersection of national security and emerging and disruptive technologies.

AFF is the most promising effort I have seen in tackling the long-term challenges of funding and scaling emerging and disruptive technologies head-on.

At stake is whether the rest of the 21st century will be determined by an authoritarian government wiling to impose a dystopian future on the world, or free nations able to determine their own future.

These are tough problems to solve, and no single fund is can take on the massive investments China is making, but it’s possible that the AFF’s market driven approach, when combined with the government’s halting steps reengaging in industrial policy, can tip the scale back in our favor.

Here’s hoping they succeed.

Filed under: National Security | 2 Comments »

The U.S. Department of Defense is coming to grips with the idea that the technologies it needs to keep the country safe and secure are no longer exclusively owned by the military or its prime contractors. AI, machine learning, autonomy, cyber, quantum, access to space, semiconductors, biotech are all being driven by commercial companies.  At the front-end of these innovations are startups – organizations the Department of Defense hasn’t previously dealt with at scale.

They’re now learning how.

Mrinal Menon is one of my Hacking for Defense students at Stanford where he’s currently in the MBA program. He’s a former U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer. Jeff Decker is a co-instructor of the Hacking for Defense class and the Stanford program director. Jeff is an Army Second Ranger Battalion veteran.

Mrinal and Jeff’s article below explains how startups can adapt and thrive while working with the Defense Department. And how the Department of Defense is learning to work with startups.

This article previously appeared in Fast Company.

At a time when young companies struggle to find technology sectors not dominated by Silicon Valley’s giants, most startups remain oblivious to one of the largest markets in the world, the U.S. Defense Department. The military awarded $445 billion in contracts in 2020. By comparison, last year’s global market for software-as-a-service, one of the hottest sectors for startup creation and investment, was estimated at $104 billion.

There’s a willing market here, too. The Pentagon is eager for help from the nation’s innovators. The military is clamoring for cutting-edge technologies in areas like artificial intelligence, machine learning, and autonomy. To attract interest the Defense Department is handing out unprecedented numbers of small contracts and in 2020 seeded 1,635 firms with more than $1.5 billion in early funding. Dozens of outreach programs across the military now offer quick revenue to early-stage companies. A startup could land a contract worth up to $3 million within months of entering the defense market.

This emerging opportunity reflects the urgency of keeping pace with rivals like China and Russia, who are furiously integratingcommercial technologies like AI, quantum computing, and unmanned systems into their armed forces. If former Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s prediction about China overtaking the United States in AI comes to pass, the People’s Liberation Army could be better prepared than the U.S. military for future conflicts in which cyberattacks and drone swarms play a larger role than warships and fighter jets. Without adopting cutting-edge commercial technologies, the U.S. military may be rendered obsolete.

Yet, for every newly minted success like Palantir or Anduril, thousands of companies struggle to find follow-on opportunities after receiving early innovation contracts. Historically, more than 80% of new entrants exit the defense market before they have a chance to see recurring revenue. Anduril founder Palmer Luckey has sardonically noted that the only defense companies to reach unicorn status in the past 30 years have all been founded by billionaires able to endure long gaps in funding. To truly compete with technologically advanced rivals, the Defense Department will ultimately need to enable a broad pool of innovative founders to succeed. Until this ecosystem materializes, however, building a successful defense business is likely to take years of grueling effort. Before committing to work with the military, startups must look past the allure of early money and carefully assess whether the defense market is right for them.

The Key Questions For Startup
Despite the Pentagon’s newfound enthusiasm for innovation, startups in the defense market continue to encounter longstanding obstacles. Most companies face uncertainty when trying to bridge prototyping awards with more permanent follow-on contracts. Startups that successfully fulfill innovation contracts don’t automatically scale. Instead, their solutions must still compete for funding in a formal budgeting and acquisition process before being eligible for widespread adoption . This ordeal takes two years or more, during which startups should anticipate little or no revenue as they try to push their product through the bureaucracy.

While earning the first $1 million in the defense market can be relatively easy, landing the next $10 million is extremely difficult. Before committing to work with the military, startups should carefully consider whether the defense market is right for them by asking three questions.

Is there strong interest for the product?
Those that offer solutions to high-priority problems have the best chance of sourcing funding and follow-on awards. Startups should assess how well their technologies align with the needs outlined in the defense budget, various modernization strategies, and problems posed by defense innovation hubs. For example, “flying taxi” startup Joby Aviation aligned its electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft with the Air Force’s stated interest in advancing the market for air mobility vehicles. The 3D mapping company Hivemapper found traction with the Army by targeting its need to autonomously resupply field artillery units.

Is the company prepared to endure revenue gaps?
As noted, companies may go years without defense revenue while trying to bridge early contracts with larger opportunities. During this period, startups will need to sustain business development activities and may incur additional regulatory and compliance costs to ensure their product is usable by the military. Investors are also likely to express impatience with the long timelines of defense sales. The best prepared companies can either raise sufficient funds to keep operating or count on revenue from other sources. Palmer Luckey’s Anduril has aggressively pursued financingto sustain growth. Recently public enterprise-AI firm C3.ai entered the defense market having already built a successful commercial business in the energy vertical. Similarly, 3D-printing homebuilder Icon’s technologies have applications that extend well beyond national security use cases to commercial housing markets.

Can I balance the needs of my defense and commercial customers?
The best-positioned startups solve fundamentally similar problems for both military and commercial users. Satellite imagery firm Orbital Insight’s Go platform, for example, automates imagery analysis for defense analysts, investors, and agribusiness alike. Some amount of customization is inevitable given that military users often have specific mission requirements or technical constraints. However, companies that can serve military customers without fundamentally altering their existing product roadmap are likely to be most successful.

Incidents like Google’s withdrawal from Project Maven have highlighted the potential for conflict when commercial companies decide to work with the military. This tension tends to be lower at startups where an early team willingly signs on to pursue defense business. Regardless, companies should be mindful of the reputational impacts working with the DoD could have on their existing business.

The Case for Optimism
Companies eyeing the defense market have reason to be optimistic. There are a growing number of efforts to remove obstacles to partnerships between high-tech startups and the military. For example, the Air Force last year created the Strategic Financing (STRATFI) program. STRATFI provides the Air Force’s most promising commercial innovators, a list which includes Icon and Orbital Insight, quick access to large contracts worth up to $15M. Another positive sign is President Biden’s nomination of former Symantec CEO Mike Brown to oversee the Pentagon’s purchases of new technologies. As director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Brown has spearheaded investments in commercial technologies and helped C3.ai, Joby Aviation, and other Silicon Valley standouts navigate funding gaps. If confirmed, Brown could accelerate much needed reforms to military acquisition processes.

A startup that makes it through the hurdles may find a massive market with a stable set of customers eager for better technology solutions. The U.S. government pays its bills on time, defense budgets are shielded from short-term volatility, and contracts may be guaranteed for multiple years. Once onboarded, military users can quickly become long-term customers given the challenges involved with switching to another product.

Filed under: National Security | 1 Comment »

A version of this story previously appeared in Defense One.

The story of RYAN and Able Archer is an oft-told lesson of a U.S. intelligence failure, miscalculation, and two superpowers unaware they were on the brink of an accidental nuclear war — all because the Soviet Union relied on a software program to make predictions that were based on false assumptions.

As more of our weapons systems and analytical and predictive systems become enabled by AI and Machine Learning, the lessons of RYAN and Able Archer is a cautionary tale for the DoD.

In 1983, the world’s superpowers drew near to accidental nuclear war, largely because the Soviet Union relied on software to make predictions that were based on false assumptions. Today, as the Pentagon moves to infuse artificial-intelligence tools into just about every aspect of its workings, it’s worth remembering the lessons of RYAN and Able Archer.

Two years earlier, the Soviet Union had deployed a software program dubbed RYAN, for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie, or sudden nuclear missile attack. Massive for its time, RYAN sought to compute the relative power of the two superpowers by modeling 40,000 military, political, and economic factors, including 292 “indicators” reported from agents (spies) abroad. It was run by the KGB, which employed more than 200 people just to input the data.

The Soviets built RYAN to warn them when their country’s relative strength had declined to a point that the U.S. might launch a preemptive first strike on the Soviet Union. Leaders decided that if Soviet power was at least 70 percent of that of the United States the balance of power was stable. As the months went by, this number plummeted. By 1983, RYAN reported that Soviet power had declined to just 45 percent of that of the United States.

This amplified Soviet leaders’ paranoia. After 25 years of back-and-forth in the nuclear arms race, the Peacekeeper ICBM and the Trident SLBM were tipping the balance in favor of the United States. Responding to the Soviet introduction of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Eastern Europe in 1983, the U.S. deployed Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles missiles to Western Europe, which reduced warning time of attack on Moscow to less than eight minutes. And in March 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative – “Star Wars” – to intercept Soviet ICBMs, then piled on just weeks later by publicly labeling the Soviet Union “the Evil Empire.” And to cap off a very bad year in the Cold War, in September 1983 the Soviets accidentally shot down a civilian 747 airliner—KAL 007—killing all 269 aboard.

By 1983, Soviet political and military leaders truly believed a nuclear war was coming. The RYAN program took on even greater importance. To feed RYAN, the KGB made its top priority to collect indicators of anything that might precede a potential surprise nuclear missile attack. They were looking for direct indicators—had the U.S. Continuity of Government program (doomsday planes) been activated? Had the U.S. given advance warning to launch our strategic nuclear forces? They also collected secondary indicators. Their agents inside the U.S. and allied countries watched for heightened activities in and around Washington offices (White House, Pentagon, State Dept, CIA, etc.), including the White House parking lot, places of evacuation and shelter, the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of where nuclear weapons were stored, etc. Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war. Soviet case officers were instructed to look for deviations in the behavior of people in possession of classified information suddenly moving into specially equipped secure accommodations.

While most of the KGB station chiefs and case officers thought Moscow was being paranoid, they dutifully reported what they thought their leaders wanted to hear.

By November 1983, Soviet military and political leaders had convinced themselves that a nuclear first strike from the United States was probable. The RYAN program told them that the odds favored the U.S., and the war indicators in Moscow were flashing red.

That month, NATO ran a highly realistic set of wargames in Europe called Able Archer 83. These included an airlift of 19,000 U.S. soldiers in 170 aircraft under radio silence to Europe, the shifting of commands from Permanent War Headquarters to the Alternate War Headquarters, and practicing nuclear weapons release procedures.

In reaction, the Chief of the Soviet Air Forces ordered all units of the Soviet 4th Air Army on alert which included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons. It appears that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Able Archer.

Luckily, no one overreacted. The Able Archer 83 exercise passed.

For years, the U.S had no idea that the Soviet Union had believed the exercise was a cover to launch a nuclear first strike. The Berlin Wall had fallen by the time information from a defector and an end-of-tour letter from the U.S. general responsible for Air Force Intelligence in Europe prompted presidential intelligence board to revisit what the Soviets had thought. In hindsight, RYAN and Able Archer took the Cold War to the brink of Armageddon.

Even when RYAN was reporting that the U.S. had a decisive military advantage, what made the Soviets believe that we would launch a first-nuclear strike? No one knows. However, given Nazi Germany’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union in WWII, resulting in 25 million dead and the extreme devastation inflicted on their country, the Soviet Union had reason to be paranoid. Some have suggested that the Soviets had interpreted President Carter’s 1980 Presidential Directive 59 Nuclear Weapon Employment Policy as preparation for a nuclear first strike. Perhaps the Soviet Union ascribed their own plans for a first strike on the U.S. to their Cold War enemy. Or perhaps the U.S. actually did have a first-strike option in one of our operational plans that the Soviets discovered via espionage.

Why were the Soviets convinced that a war would start with a war game? Several months after Able Archer, the Soviet Minister of Defense publicly acknowledged his country’s inability to tell a big NATO exercise from an actual attack: “It was difficult to catch the difference between working out training questions and actual preparation of large-scale aggression.” It’s quite likely that the Soviets’ own plans for launching a war in Europe would have been as part of a war game.

Certainly the Soviets, believing the signals of the RYAN alert system, were primed to assume a U.S. attack. In attempting to automate military policy and potential actions, the Soviets had amplified their existing paranoia. (A movie called War Games came out that year with some of the same themes.)

A Cautionary Tale for Automating Policy and Prediction
Forty years ago RYAN attempted to automate military policy and potential actions. But in the end, RYAN failed in actually predicting U.S. intent. Instead, RYAN reinforced existing fears, and accidently created its own paranoia.

Which leads to the question: What could happen when we start using Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to shape policy?

• What could happen when we start using artificial intelligence and machine learning to shape policy?
• Will AI/ML actually predict human intent?
• What happens when the machines start seeing patterns that aren’t there?
• How do we ensure that unintentional bias doesn’t creep into the model?
• How much will we depend on an AI that can’t explain how it reached its decision?
• How do we deconflict and deescalate machine-driven conclusions? Where and when should the humans be in the loop?
• How do we ensure foreign actors can’t pollute the datasets and sensors used to drive the model and/or steal the model and look for its vulnerabilities?
• How do we ensure that those with a specific agenda (i.e. Andropov, chairman of the KGB) don’t bias the data?
• How do we ensure we aren’t using a software program that misleads our own leaders?

The somewhat-comforting news is that others have been thinking about these problems for a while. In 2020, the Defense Department formally adopted five AI ethical principles recommended by the Defense Innovation Board for the development of artificial intelligence capabilities: AI projects need to be Responsible, Equitable, Traceable, Reliable and Governable. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center appointed a head of ethics policy to translate these principles into practice. Under JAIC’s 2.0 mission, they are no longer the sole developer of AI projects, but instead providing services and common software platforms. Now it’s up to the JAIC ethics front office to ensure that the hundreds of mission areas and contractors across the DoD adhere to these standards.

Here’s hoping they all remember the lessons of RYAN.

Lessons Learned

• RYAN amplified the paranoia the Soviet leadership already had
• The assumptions and beliefs of people who create the software shape the outcomes
• Using data to model an adversary’s potential actions is limited by your ability to model its leaderships intent
• Your planning and world view are almost guaranteed not to be the same as those of your adversary
• Having an overwhelming military advantage may force an adversary into a corner. They may act in ways that seem irrational
• Responsible, Equitable, Traceable, Reliable and Governable are great aspirational goals

Filed under: National Security | 1 Comment »